

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF WYOMING

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION
OF DOMINION ENERGY WYOMING TO
INCREASE DISTRIBUTION RATES AND
CHARGES AND MAKE TARIFF
MODIFICATIONS

Docket No. 30010-187-GR-19

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF
ROBERT B. HEVERT
FOR DOMINION ENERGY WYOMING

November 1, 2019

DEW Exhibit 2.0

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	WITNESS IDENTIFICATION AND QUALIFICATIONS	1
II.	PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW OF TESTIMONY.....	2
III.	SUMMARY OF ISSUES SURROUNDING COST OF EQUITY ESTIMATION IN REGULATORY PROCEEDINGS.....	8
IV.	COST OF EQUITY ESTIMATION.....	14
	Proxy Group Selection.....	14
	Cost of Equity Estimation.....	17
V.	BUSINESS RISKS AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS.....	25
	Small Size	25
	Electrification	28
	Flotation Costs	29
VI.	CAPITAL MARKET ENVIRONMENT	32
VII.	CAPITAL STRUCTURE	43
VIII.	COST OF DEBT.....	44
IX.	CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION	45
X.	APPENDIX A.....	47
	A. Constant Growth Discounted Cash Flow Model	47
	B. CAPM Analysis and Empirical CAPM Analysis	53
	C. Bond Yield Plus Risk Premium Approach	62
	D. Expected Earnings Analysis	65

GLOSSARY OF FREQUENTLY USED TERMS

TERM	DESCRIPTION
Beta Coefficient	A component of the CAPM that measures the risk of a given stock relative to the risk of the overall market.
Bond Yield Plus Risk Premium Approach	A risk premium model used to estimate the Cost of Equity. The Bond Yield Plus Risk Premium approach assumes that investors require a risk premium over the Cost of Debt as compensation for assuming the greater risk of common equity investment. The model is expressed as a bond yield plus equity risk premium.
Capital Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”)	A risk premium-based model used to estimate the Cost of Equity, assuming the stock is added to a well-diversified portfolio. The CAPM assumes that investors are compensated for the time value of money (represented by the Risk-Free Rate), and risk (represented by the combination of the Beta Coefficient and the Market Risk Premium).
Constant Growth DCF Model	A form of the DCF model that assumes cash flows will grow at a constant rate, in perpetuity. The model simplifies to a form that expresses the Cost of Equity as the sum of the expected dividend yield and the expected growth rate.
Cost of Debt	The contractually defined return to debt holders as the interest rate or yield on debt securities.
Cost of Equity	The return required by investors to invest in equity securities. The terms “Return on Equity” and “Cost of Equity” are used interchangeably.
Discounted Cash Flow (“DCF”) Model	A model used to estimate the Cost of Equity based on expected cash flows. The Cost of Equity equals the discount rate that sets the current market price equal to the present value of expected cash flows.
Dividend Yield	For a given stock, the current annualized dividend divided by its current market price.
Empirical Capital Asset Pricing Model (“ECAPM”)	Empirical CAPM is a variant of the CAPM model. ECAPM adjusts for the CAPM’s tendency to underestimate returns for companies that have Beta coefficients less than one, and over-estimate returns for relatively high-Beta coefficient stocks.
Expected Earnings	An analysis of actual expected earnings used to corroborate a reasonable ROE range.

TERM	DESCRIPTION
Flotation Costs	Flotation costs are the costs associated with the sale of new issues of common stock. These costs include out-of-pocket expenditures for preparation, filing, underwriting and other issuance costs of common stock.
Market Return	The expected return on the equity market, taken as a portfolio.
Market Risk Premium	The additional compensation required by investing in the equity market as a portfolio over the Risk-Free rate. The Market Risk Premium is a component of the CAPM.
Proxy Group	A group of publicly traded companies used as the “proxy” for the subject company (in this case, Dominion Energy Wyoming). Proxy companies are sometimes referred to as “Comparable Companies.”
Return on Equity (“ROE”)	The return required by investors to invest in equity securities. The terms “Return on Equity” and “Cost of Equity” are used interchangeably. Please note that the ROE in this context is distinct from the accounting measure sometimes referred to as the “Return on Average Common Equity”.
Risk-Free Rate	The rate of return on an asset with no risk of default.
Risk Premium	The additional compensation required by investors for taking on additional increments of risk. Risk Premium-based approaches are used in addition to the DCF and CAPM to estimate the Cost of Equity.
Treasury Yield	The return on Treasury securities; the yield on long-term Treasury bonds is considered to be a measure of the Risk-Free Rate.

1 **I. WITNESS IDENTIFICATION AND QUALIFICATIONS**

2 **Q. Please state your name, affiliation, and business address.**

3 A. My name is Robert B. Hevert. I am a Partner at ScottMadden, Inc. and my business
4 address is 1900 West Park Drive, Suite 250, Westborough, MA 01581.

5 **Q. On whose behalf are you submitting this testimony?**

6 A. I am submitting this direct testimony (“Direct Testimony”) before the Public Service
7 Commission of Wyoming (“Commission”) on behalf of Dominion Energy Wyoming
8 (“DEW” or the “Company”).

9 **Q. Please describe your educational background.**

10 A. I hold a Bachelor’s degree in Business and Economics from the University of Delaware,
11 and an MBA with a concentration in Finance from the University of Massachusetts. I
12 also hold the Chartered Financial Analyst designation.

13 **Q. Please describe your experience in the energy and utility industries.**

14 A. I have worked in regulated industries for over thirty years, having served as an executive
15 and manager with consulting firms, a financial officer of a publicly traded natural gas
16 utility, and an analyst at a telecommunications utility. In my role as a consultant, I have
17 advised numerous energy and utility clients on a wide range of financial and economic
18 issues including corporate and asset-based transactions, asset and enterprise valuation,
19 transaction due diligence, and strategic matters. As an expert witness, I have provided
20 testimony in more than 250 proceedings regarding various financial and regulatory
21 matters before numerous state utility regulatory agencies, the Federal Energy Regulatory
22 Commission (“FERC”), the Alberta Utilities Commission, and United States Federal

23 Court. A summary of my professional and educational background, including a list of
24 my testimony in prior proceedings, is included as DEW Exhibit 2.1 to my Direct
25 Testimony.

26 **II. PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW OF TESTIMONY**

27 **Q. What is the purpose of your Direct Testimony?**

28 A. My Direct Testimony presents evidence and provides a recommendation regarding the
29 Company's Return on Equity ("ROE").¹ Additionally, I assess the reasonableness of the
30 Company's proposed capital structure and Cost of Debt to be used for ratemaking
31 purposes. My analyses and conclusions are supported by the data presented in DEW
32 Exhibit 2.2 through DEW Exhibit 2.12, which have been prepared by me or under my
33 direction.

34 **Q. Please summarize your conclusions regarding the appropriate Cost of Equity and
35 capital structure for the Company.**

36 A. My analyses indicate that an ROE in the range of 9.90 percent to 10.75 percent represents
37 the range of equity investors' required return for investment in a natural gas utility such
38 as DEW in today's capital markets. Based on the quantitative and qualitative analyses
39 discussed throughout my Direct Testimony, including the risk profile of the Company, it
40 is my view that 10.50 percent is a reasonable and appropriate estimate of the Company's
41 Cost of Equity. That ROE, together with the Company's proposed capital structure and
42 Cost of Debt, produces an overall rate of return of 7.74 percent.²

1 Throughout my Direct Testimony, I interchangeably use the terms "ROE" and "Cost of Equity."
2 $7.74\% = (10.50\% \times 55.00\%) + (4.37\% \times 45.00\%)$.

43 As to the Company's proposed capital structure, consisting of 55.00 percent
44 common equity and 45.00 percent long-term debt, I conclude that the Company's
45 proposal is consistent with the capital structures that have been in place over several
46 fiscal quarters at comparable utility companies.³ Given the consistency of its proposal
47 with similarly situated utility companies, I conclude that the Company's proposed capital
48 structure is reasonable and appropriate. Regarding the Cost of Debt, the Company has
49 proposed a rate of 4.37 percent, which I find reasonable and appropriate.

50 **Q. Please provide a brief overview of the analyses that led to your ROE**
51 **recommendation.**

52 A. Because all financial models are subject to various assumptions and constraints, equity
53 analysts and investors tend to use multiple methods to develop their return requirements.
54 I therefore relied on three widely-accepted approaches to develop my ROE
55 recommendation: (1) the Constant Growth Discounted Cash Flow ("DCF") model; (2)
56 the traditional and empirical forms of the Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM"); and
57 (3) the Bond Yield Plus Risk Premium approach. Those analyses indicate the Company's
58 Cost of Equity currently to be in the range of 9.90 percent to 10.75 percent. That range is
59 corroborated by the Expected Earnings approach which, as I discuss later in my Direct
60 Testimony, is supported by recent FERC orders.

61 In addition to the methodologies noted above, my estimate also takes into
62 consideration (1) the Company's relatively small size compared to the proxy group and
63 (2) the risk associated with electrification on the natural gas utility sector. I also

³ As discussed below, I note that the Company's actual common equity percentage is 60.00 percent. However, I understand that the proposed common equity percentage is the result of a stipulation approved by the Commission.

64 calculated the costs of issuing common stock (that is, “flotation” costs), and considered
65 the changing capital market and business conditions, including changes in Federal
66 Reserve monetary policy. Although these factors are very relevant to investors, their
67 effect on the Company’s Cost of Equity cannot be directly quantified. Therefore,
68 although I did not make any explicit adjustments to my ROE estimates for those factors, I
69 did take them into consideration in determining where the Company’s Cost of Equity
70 falls within the range of analytical results. In light of those analyses, I believe my
71 recommended range is reasonable and appropriate.

72 **Q. What are the key factors considered in your analyses and upon which you base your**
73 **recommended ROE?**

74 A. My analyses and recommendations consider the following key factors:

- 75 • The *Hope* and *Bluefield* (as referenced and defined below) decisions that
76 established the standards for determining a fair and reasonable allowed return on
77 equity, including: (1) consistency of the allowed return with other businesses
78 having similar risk; (2) adequacy of the return to provide access to capital and
79 support credit quality; and (3) confidence that the end result leads to just and
80 reasonable rates.
- 81 • The effect of the current capital market conditions on investors’ return
82 requirements.
- 83 • The Company’s business risks relative to the proxy group of comparable
84 companies and the implications of those risks in arriving at the appropriate ROE.

85 As discussed further in Section VI, I considered the results of these methods in the
86 context of general capital market factors. Based on those analyses, I conclude that a

87 range of 9.90 percent to 10.75 percent represents reasonable estimates of the Company's
88 Cost of Equity.

89 **Q. How is the remainder of your Direct Testimony organized?**

90 A. The balance of my Direct Testimony is organized as follows:

- 91 • Section III – Provides a summary of issues regarding Cost of Equity estimation in
92 regulatory proceedings and discusses the regulatory guidelines pertinent to the
93 development of the cost of capital;
- 94 • Section IV – Provides an overview of the Cost of Equity analyses;
- 95 • Section V – Provides a discussion on specific risk factors and other considerations
96 that have a direct bearing on DEW's Cost of Equity;
- 97 • Section VI – Highlights the current capital market conditions and their effect on
98 the Company's Cost of Equity;
- 99 • Section VII – Provides my analysis of DEW's proposed capital structure;
- 100 • Section VIII – Provides my analysis of DEW's proposed Cost of Debt;
- 101 • Section IX – Summarizes my conclusions and recommendations; and
- 102 • Section X – Appendix A, which provides the technical details of my analytical
103 approaches.

104 **Q. What are the results of your analyses?**

105 A. The results of my analyses are summarized in Table 1 through Table 3, below.

106

Table 1: Summary of Constant Growth DCF Results⁴

	Mean	Mean High
30-Day Average	9.95%	13.98%
90-Day Average	9.94%	13.97%
180-Day Average	10.01%	14.05%

107

108

Table 2: Summary of CAPM Results⁵

CAPM	Bloomberg Derived Market Risk Premium	Value Line Derived Market Risk Premium
<i>Average Bloomberg Beta Coefficient</i>		
Current 30-Year Treasury (2.11%)	9.14%	9.30%
Near Term Projected 30-Year Treasury (2.28%)	9.31%	9.47%
<i>Average Value Line Beta Coefficient</i>		
Current 30-Year Treasury (2.11%)	10.22%	10.41%
Near Term Projected 30-Year Treasury (2.28%)	10.40%	10.58%
Empirical CAPM	Bloomberg Derived Market Risk Premium	Value Line Derived Market Risk Premium
<i>Average Bloomberg Beta Coefficient</i>		
Current 30-Year Treasury (2.11%)	10.40%	10.59%
Near Term Projected 30-Year Treasury (2.28%)	10.57%	10.76%
<i>Average Value Line Beta Coefficient</i>		
Current 30-Year Treasury (2.11%)	11.22%	11.43%
Near Term Projected 30-Year Treasury (2.28%)	11.39%	11.60%

109

4 DEW Exhibit 2.2.
5 DEW Exhibit 2.6.

110 **Table 3: Summary of Bond Yield Plus Risk Premium Results⁶**

Bond Yield Plus Risk Premium Approach	
Current 30-Year Treasury (2.11%)	9.96%
Near Term Projected 30-Year Treasury (2.28%)	9.91%
Long Term Projected 30-Year Treasury (3.70%)	10.01%

111
112 As shown in Tables 1 through 3, I have performed several analyses to estimate the
113 Company's Cost of Equity. Those results are supported by the results of my Expected
114 Earnings analysis, which range from 9.08 percent to 12.09 percent, with an average of
115 10.73 percent, and a median of 10.24 percent.⁷ Based on those analytical results, and in
116 light of the considerations discussed throughout the balance of my Direct Testimony, I
117 believe a reasonable range is from 9.90 percent to 10.75 percent. Within that range, and
118 considering the specific risk profile of DEW, I believe an ROE of 10.50 percent is
119 appropriate.

120 **Q. Are there other factors that should be considered in determining the weight given to**
121 **the methods and results summarized above?**

122 A. Yes. All models used to estimate the Cost of Equity require certain assumptions, which
123 may become more, or less, relevant as market conditions and data change. Important
124 considerations are the consistency of each model's underlying assumptions with current
125 and expected market conditions, and the reasonableness of its results relative to
126 observable benchmarks.

127 Risk Premium-based methods (such as the CAPM) provide a measure of risk and
128 directly reflect investors' expectations regarding future market returns. Other Risk

6 DEW Exhibit 2.7.
7 DEW Exhibit 2.8.

129 Premium approaches (such as the Bond Yield Plus Risk Premium approach) reflect the
130 well-documented finding that the Cost of Equity does not move in lock-step with interest
131 rates. For example, at times interest rates fall because investors can be so risk averse that
132 they would rather accept a very modest return on Treasury securities than take on the risk
133 of equity ownership. In such circumstances, low interest rates suggest an increasing, not
134 a decreasing, Cost of Equity. Therefore, the important analytical issue is understanding
135 each model's fundamental structure and assumptions, and considering its results in the
136 context of current and expected market conditions.

137 As discussed in Section III, below, the ROE should be comparable to returns
138 investors expect to earn on other investments of similar risk. To that point, the mean low
139 results of my Constant Growth DCF model are below any authorized ROE for a natural
140 gas utility since at least 1980⁸ and approximately 200 basis points below DEW's
141 currently authorized ROE. With those considerations in mind, I believe my
142 recommendation reasonably reflects investors' return requirements in the current market
143 environment.

144 **III. SUMMARY OF ISSUES SURROUNDING COST OF EQUITY ESTIMATION IN**
145 **REGULATORY PROCEEDINGS**

146 **Q. Before addressing the specific aspects of this proceeding, please provide a general**
147 **overview of the issues surrounding the Cost of Equity in regulatory proceedings.**

148 A. In general terms, the Cost of Equity is the return investors require to make an equity
149 investment in a firm. That is, investors will only provide funds to a firm if the return they
150 *expect* is equal to, or greater than, the return they *require* to accept the risk of providing

8 Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence, Regulatory Research Associates.

151 funds to the firm. From the firm's perspective, that required return, whether it is
152 provided to debt or equity investors, has a cost. Individually, we speak of the "Cost of
153 Debt" and the "Cost of Equity"; together, they are referred to as the "Cost of Capital."

154 The Cost of Capital (including the costs of both debt and equity) is based on the
155 economic principle of "opportunity costs." Investing in any asset, whether debt or equity
156 securities, implies a forgone opportunity to invest in alternative assets. For an investment
157 to be sensible, its expected return must be at least equal to the return expected on
158 alternative, comparable investment opportunities. If it is not, investors will sell the
159 "over-valued" security, and buy the "under-valued" security until the expected returns on
160 the two are aligned.

161 Although both debt and equity have required costs, they differ in certain
162 fundamental ways. Most noticeably, the Cost of Debt is contractually defined and can be
163 directly observed as the interest rate or yield on debt securities.⁹ The Cost of Equity, on
164 the other hand, is neither directly observable nor a contractual obligation. Rather, equity
165 investors have a claim on cash flows only after debt holders are paid; the uncertainty (or
166 risk) associated with those residual cash flows determines the Cost of Equity. Because
167 equity investors bear that additional "residual risk," they require higher returns than debt
168 holders. In that basic sense, equity and debt investors differ: they invest in different
169 securities, face different risks, and require different returns.

170 Whereas the Cost of Debt can be directly observed, the Cost of Equity must be
171 estimated or inferred based on market data and various financial models. As discussed
172 throughout my Direct Testimony, each model is subject to its own set of assumptions,

9 The observed interest rate may be adjusted to reflect issuance or other directly observable costs.

173 which may become more, or less, applicable as market conditions change. In addition,
174 because the Cost of Equity is an opportunity cost, the models typically are applied to a
175 group of “comparable” or “proxy” companies. The choice of models (including their
176 inputs), the selection of proxy companies, and the interpretation of model results all
177 require the application of reasoned judgment. That judgment should consider data and
178 information, both quantitative and qualitative, not necessarily included in the models
179 themselves.

180 In the end, the estimated Cost of Equity should reflect the return that investors
181 require in light of relevant risks, and the returns available on comparable investments. A
182 given utility stock may require a higher return based on the risks to which it is exposed
183 relative to other utilities. That is, although utilities may be viewed as a “sector”, that
184 does not mean that all utilities require the same return. The assessment of relative risk
185 and its effect on the Cost of Equity requires the application of reasoned, experienced
186 judgment applied to a variety of data, much of which is qualitative in nature.

187 **Q. Please summarize the regulatory guidelines established for the purpose of**
188 **determining the ROE.**

189 A. The United States Supreme Court (the “Court”) established the guiding principles for
190 establishing a fair return for capital in two cases: (1) *Bluefield Water Works and*
191 *Improvement Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of West Virginia*, 262 U.S. 679 (1923)
192 (“*Bluefield*”); and (2) *Federal Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co.*, 320 U.S. 591
193 (1944) (“*Hope*”). In those cases, the Court recognized that the fair rate of return on
194 common equity should be: (1) comparable to returns investors expect to earn on other
195 investments of similar risk; (2) sufficient to assure confidence in the company’s financial

196 integrity; and (3) adequate to maintain and support the company's credit and to attract
197 capital.

198 **Q. Does Wyoming precedent provide similar guidance?**

199 A. Yes. The Commission has followed the principles set out in *Hope* and *Bluefield* in
200 establishing a fair rate of return. In the Company's 2009 rate case, the Commission
201 noted:

202 Regarding an allowable rate of return, the Commission's discretion
203 must be guided by the earnings and capital attraction standards of
204 [*Bluefield*] and [*Hope*]; accepted in Wyoming in *In re Northern*
205 *Utilities*, 70 Wyo. 225, 247 P.2d 767 (Wyo. 1952).¹⁰

206 Based on these standards, the authorized ROE should provide the Company with the
207 opportunity to earn a fair and reasonable return, and should enable efficient access to
208 external capital under a variety of market conditions.

209 **Q. Why is it important for a utility to be allowed the opportunity to earn a return**
210 **adequate to attract equity capital at reasonable terms?**

211 A. A return that is adequate to attract capital at reasonable terms enables the utility to
212 provide service while maintaining its financial integrity. As discussed above, and in
213 keeping with the *Hope* and *Bluefield* standards, that return should be commensurate with
214 the returns expected elsewhere in the market for investments of equivalent risk. The
215 consequence of the Commission's order in this case, therefore, should be to provide
216 DEW with the opportunity to earn a return on equity that is: (1) adequate to attract capital
217 at reasonable terms; (2) sufficient to ensure its financial integrity; and (3) commensurate
218 with returns on investments in enterprises having corresponding risks. To the extent

¹⁰ Public Service Commission of Wyoming, Docket No. 30010-94-GR-08, Memorandum Opinion, Findings and Order, June 17, 2009, page 26, para 97.

219 DEW is provided a reasonable opportunity to earn its market-based Cost of Equity,
220 neither customers nor shareholders should be disadvantaged. In fact, a return that is
221 adequate to attract capital at reasonable terms enables the Company to provide safe,
222 reliable natural gas utility service while maintaining its financial integrity.

223 **Q. How is the Cost of Equity estimated in regulatory proceedings?**

224 A. As noted earlier (and as discussed in more detail later in my Direct Testimony), the Cost
225 of Equity is estimated by the use of various financial models. By their nature, those
226 models produce a range of results from which the ROE is estimated. That estimate must
227 be based on a comprehensive review of relevant data and information, and does not
228 necessarily lend itself to a strict mathematical solution. The key consideration in
229 determining the ROE is to ensure the overall analysis reasonably reflects investors' views
230 of the financial markets in general, and of the subject company (in the context of the
231 proxy companies) in particular.

232 The use of multiple methods, and the consideration given to them, recently was
233 addressed by the FERC. In its November 15, 2018 *Order Directing Briefs*, the FERC
234 determined that “in light of current investor behavior and capital market conditions,
235 relying on the DCF methodology alone will not produce a just and reasonable ROE”.¹¹
236 In its October 16, 2018 *Order Directing Briefs*, the FERC determined that although it
237 “previously relied solely on the DCF model to produce the evidentiary zone of
238 reasonableness...”, it is “...concerned that relying on that methodology alone will not

11 Docket Nos. EL14-12-003 and EL15-45-000, *Order Directing Briefs*, 165 FERC ¶ 61,118 (November 15, 2018) at para. 34.

239 produce just and reasonable results.”¹² As the FERC explained, because the Cost of
240 Equity depends on what the market expects, it is important to understand “how investors
241 analyze and compare their investment opportunities.”¹³ The FERC also explained that,
242 although certain investors may give some weight to the DCF approach, other investors
243 “place greater weight on one or more of the other methods...”¹⁴ Those methods include
244 the CAPM, the Risk Premium method, and the Expected Earnings method, all of which I
245 have applied in this proceeding.

246 The use of multiple models makes intuitive sense when we consider that market
247 prices are set by the buying and selling behavior of multiple investors, whose
248 circumstances, objectives, and constraints vary over time and across market conditions.
249 We cannot assume a single method is the best measure of the factors motivating those
250 decisions for all investors, at all times. Intuition suggests it is more appropriate to use as
251 many methods as we reasonably can, and to reflect the many factors motivating
252 investment decisions as best we can. In this instance, intuition, financial theory,¹⁵ and
253 financial practice reach a common conclusion: we should apply and reasonably consider
254 multiple methods when estimating the Cost of Equity.

12 Docket No. EL11-66-001, et al., *Order Directing Briefs*, 165 FERC ¶ 61,030 (October 16, 2018) at para. 30.

13 *Id.*, at para. 33.

14 *Id.*, at para. 35. *See, generally*, Docket No. PL19-4-000, *Inquiry Regarding the Commission’s Policy for Determining Return on Equity*, March 21, 2019.

15 As Professor Eugene Brigham explains: “Whereas debt and preferred stocks are contractual obligations which have easily determined costs, it is not at all easy to estimate [the Cost of Equity]. However, three methods can be used: (1) the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), (2) the discounted cash flow (DCF) model, and (3) the bond-yield-plus-risk-premium approach. These methods should not be regarded as mutually exclusive – no one dominates the others, and all are subject to error when used in practice. Therefore, when faced with the task of estimating a company’s cost of equity, we generally use all three methods and then choose among them on the basis of our confidence in the data used for each in the specific case at hand.” Eugene F. Brigham, Louis C. Gapenski, Financial Management, Theory and Practice, 7th ed., The Dryden Press, 1994, at 341.

255 Practitioners and academics recognize financial models simply are
256 approximations of investor behavior, not precise quantifications of it. They appreciate
257 that models are tools to be used in the ROE estimation process, and that strict adherence
258 to any single approach, or to the specific results of any single approach, can lead to
259 flawed or misleading conclusions. That position is consistent with the *Hope* and
260 *Bluefield* principle that it is the analytical result, as opposed to the method employed, that
261 is controlling in arriving at ROE determinations. A reasonable ROE estimate, therefore,
262 appropriately considers alternative methods and the reasonableness of their individual
263 and collective results in the context of observable, relevant market information.

264 **IV. COST OF EQUITY ESTIMATION**

265 **Q. Please briefly discuss the ROE in the context of the regulated rate of return.**

266 A. Regulated utilities primarily use common stock and long-term debt to finance their
267 capital investments. The overall rate of return weighs the costs of the individual sources
268 of capital by their respective book values. While the Cost of Debt can be directly
269 observed, the Cost of Equity is market-based and, therefore, must be estimated based on
270 observable market information.

271 ***Proxy Group Selection***

272 **Q. As a preliminary matter, why is it necessary to select a group of proxy companies to**
273 **determine the Cost of Equity for the Company?**

274 A. Because the ROE is market-based, and given that DEW is not a publicly traded entity, it
275 is necessary to establish a group of comparable, publicly traded companies to serve as its
276 “proxy.” Even if the Company were publicly traded, it is possible that transitory events
277 could bias its market value in one way or another over a given period of time. A

278 significant benefit of using a proxy group is that it moderates the effects of anomalous,
279 temporary events associated with any one company.

280 **Q. Please provide a summary profile of DEW.**

281 A. DEW, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Dominion Energy, Inc. (“DEI”), provides
282 natural gas distribution service to more than one million customers in Utah and 27,000
283 customers in southwestern Wyoming.¹⁶ DEI’s and DEW’s current long-term issuer
284 credit ratings are as follows:

285 **Table 4: Current Credit Ratings¹⁷**

	S&P	Moody’s
Dominion Energy, Inc.	BBB+ (outlook: Stable)	Baa2 (outlook: Stable)
DEW (Questar Gas Co.)	BBB+ (outlook: Stable)	A3 (outlook: Stable)

286

287 **Q. How did you select the companies included in your proxy group?**

288 A. I began with the universe of companies that Value Line classifies as Natural Gas Utilities,
289 which includes 10 domestic U.S. utilities, and applied the following screening criteria:

- 290 • Dividend Payments: Because certain of the models used in my analyses assume
291 earnings and dividends grow over time, I excluded companies that do not consistently
292 pay quarterly cash dividends;
- 293 • Utility Equity Analyst Coverage: To ensure the growth rates used in my analyses are
294 not biased by a single analyst, all the companies in my proxy group have been
295 covered by at least two utility industry equity analysts;
- 296 • Corporate Credit Rating Threshold: All the companies in my proxy group have
297 investment grade senior unsecured bond and/or corporate credit ratings from S&P;

16 <https://www.dominionenergy.com/company/moving-energy/western-gas-operations>.

17 Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence.

- 298 • Gas Distribution Operating Income Threshold: To incorporate companies that are
299 primarily regulated gas distribution utilities, I included companies with at least 60.00
300 percent of operating income derived from regulated natural gas utility operations; and
301 • Significant Events: I eliminated companies currently known to be party to a merger,
302 or other significant transaction.

303 **Q. Did you include Dominion Energy, Inc. in your proxy group?**

304 A. No. To avoid the circular logic that would otherwise occur, it has been my consistent
305 practice to exclude the subject company (or its parent) from the proxy group.
306 Additionally, DEI is not included in the universe of companies that Value Line classifies
307 as Natural Gas Utilities.

308 **Q. Why did you begin with the universe of companies that Value Line classifies as**
309 **Natural Gas Utilities?**

310 A. In this proceeding, we are estimating the Cost of Equity for DEW, a wholly owned
311 subsidiary of DEI, that is a rate regulated natural gas distribution company. By applying
312 the screening criteria discussed above, I ensured that the proxy group excludes companies
313 with regulated electric operations, or significant unregulated activities. Consequently, the
314 proxy group contained in Table 5 below contains only companies that, like DEW, are
315 focused on the regulated distribution of natural gas. Because all seven proxy companies
316 are primarily natural gas distribution utilities, they are reasonable proxies for DEW.

317 **Q. What companies met those screening criteria?**

318 A. The criteria discussed above resulted in a proxy group of the following seven companies:

319

Table 5: Proxy Group Screening Results

Company	Ticker
Atmos Energy Corporation	ATO
New Jersey Resources Corporation	NJR
Northwest Natural Holding Company	NWN
ONE Gas, Inc.	OGS
South Jersey Industries, Inc.	SJI
Spire, Inc.	SR
Southwest Gas Corporation	SWX

320

321 **Q. Do you believe that a proxy group of seven companies is sufficiently large?**

322 A. Yes. Because all analysts use some form of screening process to develop proxy groups,
323 those groups, by definition, are not randomly drawn from a larger population.
324 Consequently, there is no reason to place more reliance on the range of results derived
325 from a larger, but potentially less comparable proxy group simply by virtue of the larger
326 number of observations. Moreover, because I am using market-based data, my analytical
327 results will not necessarily be tightly clustered around a central point. Results that may
328 be somewhat dispersed do not suggest the screening approach is inappropriate or the
329 results less meaningful. Including companies whose fundamental comparability to the
330 subject company is tenuous, simply for the purpose of expanding the number of
331 observations, does not add relevant information to the analysis.

332 ***Cost of Equity Estimation***

333 **Q. How have you determined the investor-required ROE?**

334 A. As noted earlier, because the Cost of Equity is not directly observable, it must be
335 estimated based on both quantitative and qualitative information. Although several
336 empirical models have been developed for that purpose, all are subject to limiting

337 assumptions or other constraints. Consequently, many finance texts recommend using
338 multiple approaches to estimate the Cost of Equity as detailed in Section X (Appendix
339 A).¹⁸ When faced with the task of estimating the Cost of Equity, analysts and investors
340 are inclined to gather and evaluate as much relevant data as reasonably can be analyzed
341 and, therefore, rely on multiple analytical approaches.

342 As a practical matter, no individual model is more reliable than all others under
343 all market conditions. Therefore, it is important to use multiple methods to mitigate the
344 effects of assumptions and inputs associated with any single approach. As noted earlier,
345 the use of multiple methods, and the consideration given to them, recently was endorsed
346 by FERC.

347 Consistent with that approach, I have considered the results of the Constant
348 Growth DCF model, the traditional and empirical forms of the CAPM, and the Bond
349 Yield Plus Risk Premium approach. I also have provided an Expected Earnings analysis,
350 which I have applied as a corroborating method. FERC issued similar guidance, using
351 the Expected Earnings analysis in its determination of the “zone of reasonableness”,
352 observing that “*investors use those models*”.¹⁹

353 **Q. Please briefly describe the Constant Growth DCF model.**

354 A. The Constant Growth DCF approach defines the Cost of Equity as the sum of (1) the
355 expected dividend yield, and (2) expected long-term growth. As explained in Section X,
356 the model often is expressed in the familiar form

18 See, e.g., Eugene Brigham, Louis Gapenski, Financial Management: Theory and Practice, 7th Ed., 1994, at 341, and Tom Copeland, Tim Koller and Jack Murrin, Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies, 3rd ed., 2000, at 214.

19 Docket No. EL11-66-001, et al., *Order Directing Briefs*, 165 FERC ¶ 61,030 (October 16, 2018) at para. 44 (italics in original).

357 $k = \frac{D(1+g)}{P_0} + g$, where the expected dividend yield generally equals the expected annual
358 dividend divided by the current stock price, and the growth rate is based on analysts'
359 expectations of earnings growth. The Constant Growth DCF formula, which falls from
360 the longer "present value" structure,²⁰ requires several simplifying assumptions,
361 including the constancy of inputs in perpetuity.

362 Under the model's strict assumptions, the growth rate equals the rate of capital
363 appreciation (that is, the growth in the stock price).²¹ Given that assumption, it does not
364 matter whether the investor holds the stock in perpetuity, or whether they hold the stock
365 for some period of time, collect the dividends, then sell at the prevailing market price.
366 That result also requires that the ROE result reached today will remain unchanged in
367 perpetuity. So, if market conditions are such that the model produces an unreasonably
368 low (or high) ROE estimate today, it assumes that estimate will be the same ROE
369 investors require every day in the future, regardless of whether or how market conditions
370 change.

371 **Q. Please briefly describe the Capital Asset Pricing Model.**


372 A. Whereas DCF models focus on expected cash flows, Risk Premium-based models such as
373 the CAPM focus on the additional return that investors require for taking on additional
374 risk. In finance, "risk" generally refers to the variation in expected returns, rather than
375 the expected return, itself. Consider two firms, X and Y, with expected returns, and the
376 expected variation in returns noted in Chart 1, below. Although the two have the same

20 See Section X, part A.

21 As discussed in Section X, part A, the model assumes that earnings, dividends, book value, and the stock price all grow at the same constant rate in perpetuity. Additionally, academic research has indicated that analysts forecasts of growth are superior to other measures of growth (*see* Section X, part A).

377 expected return (12.50 percent), Firm Y's are far more variable. From that perspective,
378 Firm Y would be considered the riskier investment.


379 **Chart 1: Expected Return and Risk**



380
381 Now consider two other firms, Firm A and Firm B. Both have expected returns of
382 12.50 percent, and both are equally risky as measured by their volatility. But as Firm A's
383 returns go up, Firm B's returns go down. That is, the returns are negatively correlated as
384 illustrated in Chart 2, below.

385

Chart 2: Relative Risk



386

387 If we were to combine Firms A and B into a portfolio, we would expect a 12.50
388 percent return with no uncertainty because of the opposing symmetry of their risk
389 profiles. That is, we can diversify the risk away. As long as two stocks are not perfectly
390 correlated, we can achieve diversification benefits by combining them in a portfolio.
391 That is the essence of the Capital Asset Pricing Model – because we can combine firms
392 into a portfolio, the only risk that matters is the risk that remains after diversification, *i.e.*,
393 the “non-diversifiable” risk.

394 The CAPM defines the Cost of Equity as the sum of the “risk-free” rate, and a
395 premium to reflect the additional risk associated with equity investments. The “risk-free”
396 rate is the yield on a security viewed as having no default risk, such as long-term
397 Treasury bonds. The risk-free rate essentially sets the baseline of the CAPM. That is, an
398 investor would expect a higher return than the risk-free rate to purchase an asset that
399 carries risk. The difference between that higher return (*i.e.*, the required return) and the
400 risk-free rate is the risk premium.

401 Risk-Free Rate + Risk Premium = Cost of Equity [1]

402 The risk premium is defined as a security's Beta coefficient multiplied by the risk
403 premium of the overall market (the "Market Risk Premium" or "MRP"). The Beta
404 coefficient is a measure of the subject company's risk relative to the overall market, *i.e.*,
405 the "non-diversifiable" risk. A Beta coefficient of 1.00 means the security is as risky as
406 the overall market; a value below 1.00 represents a security with less risk than the overall
407 market, and a value over 1.00 represents a security with more risk than the overall
408 market.

Risk-Free Rate + (Beta Coefficient x Market Risk Premium) = Cost of Equity [2]

409 Given that the correlation between the proxy group companies and the S&P 500 has
410 declined since 2014, while the relative risk has increased,²² the CAPM in the form
411 presented here may not adequately reflect the expected systematic risk, and therefore, the
412 returns required by investors in low-Beta companies. As such, I have considered the
413 Empirical CAPM ("ECAPM") approach, which is a variant of the CAPM approach. The
414 ECAPM adjusts for the CAPM's tendency to under-estimate returns for companies that
415 (like utilities) have Beta coefficients less than one, and over-estimate returns for
416 relatively high-Beta coefficient stocks.

417 **Q. Please briefly describe the Bond Yield Plus Risk Premium approach.**

418 A. This approach is based on the basic financial principle that equity investors bear the risk
419 associated with ownership and, therefore, require a premium over the return they would
420 have earned as a bondholder. That is, because returns to equity holders are more risky

22 See Chart 10, below.

421 than returns to bondholders, equity investors must be compensated for bearing that
422 additional risk (that difference often is referred to as the “Equity Risk Premium”). Bond
423 Yield Plus Risk Premium approaches estimate the Cost of Equity as the sum of the
424 Equity Risk Premium and the yield on a particular class of bonds.

$$\text{Bond Yield} + \text{Equity Risk Premium} = \text{Cost of Equity} \quad [3]$$

425 **Q. Please summarize your analytical results.**

426 A. The results of the models described above are provided in Tables 6 and 7, below.²³

427 **Table 6: Summary of DCF Results²⁴**

	Mean Low	Mean	Mean High
30-Day Average	7.51%	9.95%	13.98%
90-Day Average	7.51%	9.94%	13.97%
180-Day Average	7.58%	10.01%	14.05%

428

23 See Section X for a more detailed description of the models, assumptions, and inputs described in Section IV.

24 DEW Exhibit 2.2.

429

Table 7: Summary of Risk Premium Results²⁵

CAPM	Bloomberg Derived Market Risk Premium	Value Line Derived Market Risk Premium
<i>Average Bloomberg Beta Coefficient</i>		
Current 30-Year Treasury (2.11%)	9.14%	9.30%
Near Term Projected 30-Year Treasury (2.28%)	9.31%	9.47%
<i>Average Value Line Beta Coefficient</i>		
Current 30-Year Treasury (2.92%)	10.22%	10.41%
Near Term Projected 30-Year Treasury (3.08%)	10.40%	10.58%
Empirical CAPM	Bloomberg Derived Market Risk Premium	Value Line Derived Market Risk Premium
<i>Average Bloomberg Beta Coefficient</i>		
Current 30-Year Treasury (2.11%)	10.40%	10.59%
Near Term Projected 30-Year Treasury (2.28%)	10.57%	10.76%
<i>Average Value Line Beta Coefficient</i>		
Current 30-Year Treasury (2.92%)	11.22%	11.43%
Near Term Projected 30-Year Treasury (3.08%)	11.39%	11.60%
Bond Yield Plus Risk Premium Approach		
Current 30-Year Treasury (2.11%)	9.96%	
Near Term Projected 30-Year Treasury (2.28%)	9.91%	
Long-Term Projected 30-Year Treasury (3.70%)	10.01%	

430

431 **Q. Please briefly describe the Expected Earnings analysis.**

432 A. The Expected Earnings analysis is based on the principle of opportunity costs. By taking
433 historical returns on book equity and comparing those to authorized ROEs, investors are
434 able to directly compare returns from investments of similar risk. In addition to historical
435 returns, Value Line also provides projected returns on book equity. I have relied solely

25 DEW Exhibit 2.6 and DEW Exhibit 2.7.

436 on forward-looking projections in the Expected Earnings analysis.²⁶ Those results range
437 from 9.08 percent to 12.09 percent, with an average of 10.73 percent and a median of
438 10.24 percent.²⁷ As noted earlier, I used those results to assess the reasonableness of the
439 DCF, CAPM, and Bond-Yield Plus Risk Premium results.²⁸

440 **V. BUSINESS RISKS AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS**

441 *Small Size*

442 **Q. Please explain the risk associated with small size.**

443 A. Both the financial and academic communities have long accepted the proposition that the
444 Cost of Equity for small firms is subject to a “size effect”.²⁹ Although empirical
445 evidence of the size effect often is based on studies of industries beyond regulated
446 utilities, utility analysts also have noted the risks with associated small market
447 capitalizations. Specifically, Ibbotson Associates noted:

448 For small utilities, investors face additional obstacles, such as a smaller
449 customer base, limited financial resources, and a lack of diversification
450 across customers, energy sources, and geography. These obstacles imply
451 a higher investor return.³⁰

452 Small size, therefore, leads to two categories of increased risk for investors: (1) liquidity
453 risk (*i.e.*, the risk of not being able to sell one’s shares in a timely manner due to the
454 relatively thin market for the securities); and (2) fundamental business risks.

26 As described more fully in Section X, an adjustment is necessary to accurately reflect the average invested capital over the period in question.

27 DEW Exhibit 2.8.

28 See Docket Nos. EL14-12-003 and EL15-45-000, *Order Directing Briefs*. (November 15, 2018).

29 Mario Levis, *The record on small companies: A review of the evidence*, Journal of Asset Management 2, March 2002, at 368-397, for a review of literature relating to the size effect.

30 Michael Annin, *Equity and the Small-Stock Effect*, Public Utilities Fortnightly, October 15, 1995.

455 **Q. How does DEW compare in size to the proxy companies?**

456 A. Relative to the proxy group, the Company is significantly smaller in terms of both
457 average customers and annual revenues. Exhibit DEW 2.9 estimates the implied market
458 capitalization for DEW. That is, because it is not a separately traded entity, an estimated
459 stand-alone market capitalization for DEW must be calculated. The implied market
460 capitalization of DEW is calculated by applying the median market-to-book ratio for the
461 proxy group of 2.30 to the Company's implied total common equity of \$35.48 million.³¹
462 The implied market capitalization based on that calculation is \$81.67 million, which is
463 approximately 1.89 percent of the proxy group median of \$4.32 billion.

464 **Q. How does the comparatively small size of DEW affect its business risks relative to**
465 **the proxy group of companies?**

466 A. In general, smaller companies are less able to withstand adverse events that affect their
467 revenues and expenses. Capital expenditures for non-revenue producing investments
468 such as system maintenance and replacements will put proportionately greater pressure
469 on customer costs, potentially leading to customer attrition or demand reduction. These
470 risks affect the return required by investors for smaller companies.

471 **Q. Is there support in the financial community for the use of a small size premium?**

472 A. Yes. There have been several studies that demonstrate the size premium. One of the
473 earliest works in this area found that over a period of 40 years "the common stock of
474 small firms had, on average, higher risk-adjusted returns than the common stock of large
475 firms."³² The author, who referred to that finding as the "size effect," suggested that the

³¹ Equity value of DEW is estimated from the proposed test year rate base and proposed equity ratio.

³² R. W. Banz, *The Relationship Between Return and Market Value of Common Stocks*, Journal of Financial Economics, 9, 1981.

476 CAPM was mis-specified in that on average, smaller firms had significantly larger risk-
477 adjusted returns than larger firms. The author also concluded that the size effect was
478 “most pronounced for the smallest firms in the sample.”³³ Since then, additional
479 empirical research has focused on explaining the size effect as a function of lower trading
480 volume and other factors, but the proposition that Beta fails to reflect the risks of smaller
481 firms persists.³⁴

482 In 1994, Fama and French focused on the issue of whether the CAPM adequately
483 explained security returns and proposed a “three factor” model for expected security
484 returns. Those factors include: (1) the covariance with the market, (2) size, and (3)
485 financial risk as determined by the book-to-market ratio. As explained by Morningstar,
486 Fama and French “found that the returns on stocks are better explained as a function of
487 size and book-to-market value in addition to the single market factor of the CAPM, with
488 the company’s size capturing the size effect and its book-to-market ratio capturing the
489 financial distress of a firm.”³⁵

490 **Q. How did you estimate the size premium for DEW?**

491 A. In its *2019 Cost of Capital Navigator*, Duff & Phelps presents its calculation of the size
492 premium for deciles of market capitalizations relative to the S&P 500 Index. An
493 additional estimate of the size premium associated with DEW, therefore, is the difference
494 in the Duff & Phelps size risk premiums for the proxy group median market
495 capitalization relative to the implied market capitalization for the Company.

³³

Id.

³⁴

See, e.g. Mario Levis, *The record on small companies: A review of the evidence*, Journal of Asset Management, March, 2002.

³⁵

Morningstar, Ibbotson SBBi 2013 Valuation Yearbook, at 109.

496 As shown on Exhibit DEW 2.9, based on recent market data, the median market
497 capitalization of the proxy group was approximately \$4.32 billion, which corresponds to
498 the fifth decile of Duff & Phelps's market capitalization data. Based on the Duff &
499 Phelps analysis, that decile has a size premium of 1.28 percent (or 128 basis points). The
500 implied market capitalization for DEW is approximately \$81.67 million, which falls
501 within the tenth decile and corresponds to a size premium of 5.22 percent (or 522 basis
502 points). The difference between those size premiums is 394 basis points (5.22 percent –
503 1.28 percent).

504 **Q. Have you considered the comparatively small size of DEW in your ROE**
505 **recommendation?**

506 A. Yes. While I have quantified the small size effect, rather than proposing a specific
507 premium, I have considered the small size of the Company in my assessment of business
508 risks in order to determine where, within a reasonable range of returns, DEW's required
509 ROE appropriately falls. In that regard, the Company's comparatively small size further
510 supports my conclusion that an ROE above the proxy group mean is reasonable.

511 *Electrification*

512 **Q. What is Electrification?**

513 A. Electrification is the conversion of fossil-fuel based transportation (*i.e.*, gasoline powered
514 vehicles) and end-use heating and appliance loads (such as oil and natural gas-fired
515 heating systems) to electricity.

516 **Q. Please explain the risk of Electrification on the natural gas utility sector?**

517 A. As noted in a recent ICF study for the American Gas Association, as states and local
518 municipalities contemplate "deep decarbonization" of their economies as the electric grid

519 becomes less carbon-intensive, policy-makers and environmental advocates are
520 considering electrification as an option for further reducing greenhouse gas emissions.³⁶
521 If successful, these policies could affect the natural gas utility sector by drastically
522 reducing demand for natural gas, leaving natural gas utilities at risk of holding stranded
523 assets.³⁷

524 ***Flotation Costs***

525 **Q. What are flotation costs?**

526 A. Flotation costs are the expenses incurred in connection with the sale of new shares of
527 equity. As discussed below, such costs include out-of-pocket expenditures for the
528 preparation, filing, underwriting, and other issuance costs of common stock.

529 **Q. Why is it important to recognize flotation costs in the allowed ROE?**

530 A. In order to attract and retain new investors, a regulated utility must have the opportunity
531 to earn a return that is both competitive and compensatory. To the extent that a company
532 is denied the opportunity to recover prudently incurred flotation costs, actual returns will
533 fall short of expected (or required) returns, thereby diminishing its ability to attract
534 adequate capital on reasonable terms.

535 **Q. Are flotation costs part of a utility's invested costs or part of the utility's expenses?**

536 A. Flotation costs are part of the invested costs of the utility, which are properly reflected on
537 the balance sheet under "paid in capital." They are not current expenses, and therefore,
538 are not reflected on the income statement. Rather, like investments in rate base or the

36 *Implications of Policy Driven Residential Electrification*, An American Gas Association Study prepared by ICF, July 2018, at 1.

37 McKinsey & Company, "Are US gas utilities nearing the end of their golden age?", September 2018, <https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/electric-power-and-natural-gas/our-insights/are-us-gas-utilities-nearing-the-end-of-their-golden-age>

539 issuance costs of long-term debt, flotation costs are incurred over time. As a result, the
540 great majority of a utility's flotation costs are incurred prior to the test year, but remain
541 part of the cost structure that exists during the test year and beyond, and should be
542 recognized for ratemaking purposes. Therefore, recovery of flotation costs is appropriate
543 even if no new issuances are planned in the near future because failure to allow such cost
544 recovery may deny DEW the opportunity to earn its required rate of return in the future.

545 **Q. Is the need to consider flotation costs eliminated because DEW is a wholly owned**
546 **subsidiary of DEI.?**

547 A. No, it is not. Although the Company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of DEI, it is
548 appropriate to consider flotation costs because wholly owned subsidiaries receive equity
549 capital from their parents and provide returns on the capital that roll up to the parent,
550 which is designated to attract and raise capital based on the returns of those subsidiaries.
551 To deny recovery of issuance costs associated with the capital that is invested in the
552 subsidiaries ultimately would penalize the investors that fund the utility operations and
553 would inhibit the utility's ability to obtain new equity capital at a reasonable cost. This is
554 important for companies such as DEW that are planning continued capital expenditures in
555 the near term, and for which access to capital (at reasonable cost rates) to fund such
556 required expenditures will be critical.

557 **Q. Do the DCF and CAPM models already incorporate investor expectations of a**
558 **return in order to compensate for flotation costs?**

559 A. No. The models used to estimate the appropriate ROE assume no "friction" or
560 transaction costs, as these costs are not reflected in the market price (in the case of the
561 DCF model) or risk premium (in the case of the CAPM and the Bond Yield Plus Risk

562 Premium model). Therefore, it is appropriate to consider flotation costs when
563 determining where within the range of reasonable results DEW's return should be set.

564 **Q. Is the need to consider flotation costs recognized by the academic and financial**
565 **communities?**

566 A. Yes. The need to reimburse investors for equity issuance costs is recognized by the
567 academic and financial communities in the same spirit that investors are reimbursed for
568 the costs of issuing debt. For example, Dr. Morin notes that “[t]he costs of issuing
569 [common stock] are just as real as operating and maintenance expenses or costs incurred
570 to build utility plants, and fair regulatory treatment must permit the recovery of these
571 costs.”³⁸ Dr. Morin further notes that “equity capital raised in a given stock issue
572 remains on the utility's common equity account and continues to provide benefits to
573 ratepayers indefinitely.”³⁹ This treatment is consistent with the philosophy of a fair rate
574 of return. As explained by Dr. Shannon Pratt:

575 Flotation costs occur when a company issues new stock. The business
576 usually incurs several kinds of flotation or transaction costs, which reduce
577 the actual proceeds received by the business. Some of these are direct out-
578 of-pocket outlays, such as fees paid to underwriters, legal expenses, and
579 prospectus preparation costs. Because of this reduction in proceeds, the
580 business's required returns must be greater to compensate for the
581 additional costs. Flotation costs can be accounted for either by amortizing
582 the cost, thus reducing the net cash flow to discount, or by incorporating
583 the cost into the cost of equity capital. Since flotation costs typically are
584 not applied to operating cash flow, they must be incorporated into the cost
585 of equity capital.⁴⁰

586 Similarly, Morningstar has commented on the need to reflect flotation costs in the cost of
587 capital:

38 Roger A. Morin, PhD, New Regulatory Finance, Public Utility Reports, Inc., 2006, at 321.

39 *Id.*, at 327.

40 Shannon P. Pratt, Roger J. Grabowski, Cost of Capital: Applications and Examples, 4th ed. (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2010), at 586.

588 Although the cost of capital estimation techniques set forth later in this
589 book are applicable to rate setting, certain adjustments may be necessary.
590 One such adjustment is for flotation costs (amounts that must be paid to
591 underwriters by the issuer to attract and retain capital).⁴¹

592 **Q. Have you estimated the effects of flotation costs?**

593 A. Yes, I modified the DCF calculation to derive the dividend yield that would reimburse
594 investors for direct issuance costs. Based on the weighted average issuance costs shown
595 in DEW Exhibit 2.10, a reasonable estimate of flotation costs is approximately 0.05
596 percent (five basis points).

597 **Q. Are you proposing to adjust your recommended ROE by five basis points to reflect**
598 **the effect of flotation costs on DEW's ROE?**

599 A. No, I am not. Rather, I have considered the effect of flotation costs, in addition to the
600 Company's other business risks, in determining where the Company's ROE should be set
601 within the reasonable range of results.

602 **VI. CAPITAL MARKET ENVIRONMENT**

603 **Q. Does your recommendation consider the current capital market environment?**


604 A. Yes, it does. From an analytical perspective, it is important that the inputs and
605 assumptions used to arrive at an ROE recommendation, including assessments of capital
606 market conditions, are consistent with the recommendation itself. Although all analyses
607 require an element of judgment, the application of that judgment must be made in the
608 context of the quantitative and qualitative information available to the analyst and the
609 capital market environment in which the analyses were undertaken.

41 Morningstar, Inc., Ibbotson SBBBI 2013 Valuation Yearbook, at 25.

610 **Q. Is there a relationship between equity market volatility and interest rates?**

611 A. Yes, there is. Significant and abrupt increases in volatility tend to be associated with
612 declines in Treasury yields. That relationship makes intuitive sense; as investors see
613 increasing risk, their objectives may shift principally to capital preservation (that is,
614 avoiding a capital loss). A means of doing so is to allocate capital to the relative safety of
615 Treasury securities, in a “flight to safety”. Because Treasury yields are inversely related
616 to Treasury bond prices, as investors bid up the prices of bonds, they bid down the yields.
617 As Chart 3, below demonstrates, decreases in the 30-year Treasury yield are coincident
618 with significant increases in the VIX.

619 **Chart 3: 30-Year Treasury Yields vs. VIX (1/2000 – 9/2019)⁴²**



620
621 In those instances, the fall in yields does not reflect a reduction in required returns, it
622 reflects an increase in risk aversion and, therefore, an increase in required equity returns.

42 Sources: S&P Global Market Intelligence; and Bloomberg Professional.

623 **Q. Has market volatility changed recently?**

624 A. Yes, it has. A visible and widely reported measure of expected volatility is the Chicago
625 Board Options Exchange (“Cboe”) Volatility Index, often referred to as the VIX. As
626 Cboe explains, the VIX “is a calculation designed to produce a measure of constant, 30-
627 day expected volatility of the U.S. stock market, derived from real-time, mid-quote prices
628 of S&P 500[®] Index (SPXSM) call and put options.”⁴³ Simply, the VIX is a market-based
629 measure of expected volatility. Because volatility is a measure of risk, increases in the
630 VIX, or in its volatility, are a broad indicator of expected increases in market risk.

631 Although the VIX is not expressed as a percentage, it should be understood as
632 such. That is, if the VIX stood at 15.00, it would be interpreted as an expected standard
633 deviation in annual market returns of 15.00 percent over the coming 30 days. Since
634 1990, the VIX has averaged about 19.19, which is highly consistent with the long-term
635 standard deviation on annual market returns (19.80 percent, as reported by Duff &
636 Phelps).⁴⁴

637 Table 8, below, demonstrates the increase in market uncertainty from 2017 to
638 2019. As the table notes, the standard deviation (that is, the volatility of volatility) from
639 2018 through 2019 is about 3.11 times higher than its 2017 level (1.36).

43 Source: http://www.cboe.com/vix_

44 Source: Duff & Phelps, 2019 SBI Yearbook, at 6-17.

640

Table 8: VIX Levels and Volatility⁴⁵

VIX Level and Volatility	
Long-term Average	19.19
2018-2019 Average	16.31
2018-2019 Maximum	37.32
2018-2019 Minimum	9.15
2018-2019 Standard Deviation	4.22
2017 Average	11.09
2017 Maximum	16.04
2017 Minimum	9.14
2017 Standard Deviation	1.36

641

642 The increase in volatility is not surprising as market participants reassess the Federal
643 Reserve's long-term objective of monetary policy normalization, and the increasing risks
644 associated with federal trade policy initiatives.

645 **Q. Is market volatility expected to increase from its current levels?**

646 A. Yes, it is. One means of assessing market expectations regarding the future level of
647 volatility is to review Cboe's "Term Structure of Volatility." As Cboe points out:

648 The implied volatility term structure observed in SPX options markets
649 is analogous to the term structure of interest rates observed in fixed
650 income markets. Similar to the calculation of forward rates of interest,
651 it is possible to observe the option market's expectation of future
652 market volatility through use of the SPX implied volatility term
653 structure.⁴⁶

654 Cboe's term structure data is upward sloping, indicating market expectations of
655 increasing volatility. The expected VIX value in December 2020 is 20.03, suggesting
656 investors see a reversion to long-term average volatility over the coming months.⁴⁷

45 Source: Bloomberg Professional.


46 Source: <http://www.cboe.com/trading-tools/strategy-planning-tools/term-structure-data>.

47 Source: <http://www.cboe.com/trading-tools/strategy-planning-tools/term-structure-data>, accessed October 14, 2019.

657 **Q. Have recent declines in Treasury yields been associated with increases in market**
658 **volatility?**

659 A. Yes, they have. Since November 2018, the periods during which Treasury yields fell
660 coincided with increases in the VIX (*see*, Chart 4, below).

661 **Chart 4: 30-Year Treasury Yields vs. VIX (11/2018 – 9/2019)⁴⁸**



662


663 **Q. Have authorized returns moved in step with the low interest rate environment?**

664 A. No, they have not. As Chart 5 (below) demonstrates, despite the decline in yields in 2015
665 and 2016, and again in late 2018 through 2019, regulatory commissions have not been
666 inclined to reduce authorized returns. The constancy of authorized returns as interest
667 rates fell also is consistent with the widely accepted principle that the Equity Risk
668 Premium increases as interest rates fall.

48 Sources: S&P Global Market Intelligence; and Bloomberg Professional.

669

Chart 5: Authorized Returns (2015 – 2019)⁴⁹



670

671 **Q. What conclusions do you draw from those analyses?**

672 A. It is important to consider whether changes in long-term interest rates reflect fundamental
673 changes in investor sentiment, or whether they reflect potentially transitory factors. The
674 recent, sudden decline in interest rates appears to be related to the increase in equity
675 market volatility, which may be event-driven rather than a fundamental change. To be
676 clear, I am not suggesting that rates should be set based on temporary events. Rather, in
677 my view, the analytical results should be reviewed within the context of the market
678 environment. Because the methods used to estimate the Cost of Equity are forward-
679 looking, it is important to consider those distinctions in assessing model results.


680 **Q. Have natural gas utility dividend yields closely followed long-term Treasury yields?**

681 A. Although they have been directionally related over time, the fundamental relationship
682 between Treasury yields and natural gas utility⁵⁰ dividend yields changed after the

⁴⁹ Excludes Limited Issue Rate Riders. Source: Regulatory Research Associates.
⁵⁰ Defined as the proxy group calculated as an index.

683 2008/2009 financial crisis. From 2000 through 2008, Treasury yields generally exceeded
 684 natural gas utility dividend yields; the exception was the 2002-2003 market contraction.
 685 Then, in 2008-2009, investors sought the safety of Treasury securities, accepting lower
 686 Treasury yields in exchange for a greater likelihood of capital preservation. Once the
 687 contraction ended (in latter half of 2009), the relationship fluctuated as the Federal
 688 Reserve implemented and maintained “unconventional” monetary policies in reaction to
 689 the financial crisis (*i.e.*, Quantitative Easing) with the intended consequence of lowering
 690 long-term interest rates (*see*, Chart 6, below). As the Federal Reserve began to
 691 “normalize” its monetary policy, the relationship was restored.

692 **Chart 6: Utility Dividend Yields and 30-Year Treasury Yields⁵¹**



693
 694 During the 2008/2009 financial crisis, Treasury bond prices increased (yields
 695 decreased), and utility stock prices decreased (dividend yields increased) such that the
 696 prior relationship became less stable. As the Federal Reserve implemented and
 697 maintained “unconventional” monetary policies in reaction to the financial crisis (*i.e.*,

51 Proxy Group Dividend Yield calculated as an index. Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence


698 Quantitative Easing) with the intended consequence of lowering long-term interest rates,
699 the unstable relationship between Treasury yields and utility dividend yields persisted.

700 Even though the “yield spread”⁵² became inverted for a period following the
701 financial crisis, it has not been static. That is, as Treasury yields fell in response to
702 central bank policies, dividend yields did not fall to the same degree, or necessarily
703 exhibit similar movements. In fact, at times the yield spread has widened (*see*, Chart 6,
704 above). That data suggests that, although utility prices are sensitive to long-term
705 Treasury yields, the relationship is not unbounded.

706 **Q. Is that relationship also seen in utility Price/Earnings (“P/E”) ratios?**

707 A. Yes, it is. Looking to the period following the Federal Reserve’s Quantitative Easing
708 policy, the proxy group P/E ratio has varied, often reverting once it has largely breached
709 its 90-day moving average (*see*, Chart 7, below).

710 **Chart 7: Proxy Group Average Price/Earnings Ratio⁵³**




711

⁵² Defined here as dividend yields less Treasury yields.

⁵³ Calculated as an index. Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence.

712 From a somewhat different perspective, the proxy group’s P/E ratio has traded within a
713 two-standard deviation range, although that range recently has widened, indicating
714 increasing variability in the group’s valuation (*see*, Chart 8, below).

715 **Chart 8: Proxy Group Average P/E Ratio Bands⁵⁴**



716
717 That data supports the conclusion discussed earlier, that utility stock prices are
718 sensitive to changes in interest rates, to a degree. The “reach for yield” that sometimes
719 occurs when interest rates fall has a limit; investors will not accept the incremental risk of
720 capital losses when utility valuation levels become “stretched”. That also may be the
721 case when investors see interest rates reacting to market volatility that is event-driven,
722 rather than a fundamental change in the capital market environment or investor risk
723 tolerances. The increasing variability can be seen in Chart 8 (above), when the bands

54 Calculated as an index. Bands represent two standard deviations calculated over 90 days. Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence.

724 around the 90-day moving average P/E ratios widen. During those periods, the risk of
725 capital loss increases, implying a further limit on valuation levels.

726 **Q. Does the reduction in the Federal Funds target rate by the Federal Reserve or an**
727 **inverted yield curve alter any of the conclusions above?**

728 A. No, it does not. As explained above, utility stock prices are sensitive to changes in
729 interest rates, but only to a point. To the extent investors expect further reductions in the
730 Federal Funds Target Rate or an inversion to the yield curve, the effects on utility stock
731 prices are not certain to be directionally related. Further, although the Federal Open
732 Market Committee (“FOMC”) reduced the overnight Federal Funds rate by a quarter
733 percentage point at each of the last two FOMC meetings, it noted that in determining the
734 timing and size of future rate adjustments,

735 ...the Committee will assess realized and expected economic
736 conditions relative to its maximum employment objective and its
737 symmetric 2 percent inflation objective. This assessment will take into
738 account a wide range of information, including measures of labor
739 market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation
740 expectations, and readings on financial and international
741 developments.⁵⁵

742 As to the longer-term, the FOMC’s September 2019 Projection Materials suggest an
743 increase in the Federal Funds rate over the “longer-run”.⁵⁶

744 Regarding expectations of an inverted yield curve, whether an inverted yield
745 curve may cause a recession, the issue of causality is not settled. As the Federal Reserve
746 Bank of Chicago (the “Chicago Fed”) observed, the analyses discussed in its recent

⁵⁵ *Federal Reserve Press Release*, September 18, 2019.

⁵⁶ Federal Open Market Committee, *Table 1. Economic projections of Federal Reserve Board members and Federal Reserve Bank presidents, under their individual assumptions of projected appropriate monetary policy, September 2019*. The projection materials explain that “[l]onger-run projections represent each participant’s assessment of the rate to which each variable would be expected to converge under appropriate monetary policy and in the absence of further shocks to the economy.”

747 research on the topic “do not imply that a yield-curve inversion causes a recession.” The
748 Chicago Fed further explained that, “[r]ather, it could be that the slope itself fluctuates to
749 reflect changing expectations about the economy, and these expectations are useful
750 predictors of economic downturns.”⁵⁷

751 Lastly, the yield curve’s ability to predict inflation has come under question since
752 the Federal Reserve implemented its policy of Quantitative Easing. A May 2019 article
753 in Barron’s, for example, observed that by taking Treasury and mortgage-backed
754 securities off the private market, the Federal Reserve “may be depressing the term
755 premium and tilting the yield curve negatively.”⁵⁸ In that case, a yield curve inversion
756 may not be due to the macroeconomic factors that otherwise would suggest an impending
757 recession.

758 **Q. What conclusions do you draw from your analyses of the current capital market**
759 **environment, and how do those conclusions affect your ROE recommendation?**

760 A. Because certain models used to estimate the Cost of Equity require long-term
761 assumptions, it is important to understand whether those assumptions hold. The current
762 market environment is one in which changes in interest rates may be associated with
763 events, more than they are a function of fundamental economic conditions. Further,
764 utility valuations have a limit, even when investors look to them for an alternate source of
765 income as interest rates fall.

766 On balance, it remains important to consider changes in market conditions, the
767 likely causes of those changes, and how model results are affected by them. Those

⁵⁷ Chicago Fed Letter, *Why does the yield-curve slope predict recessions*, Essays on Issues, 2018 Number 404, at 5.

⁵⁸ Randall W. Forsyth, *An Inverted Yield Curve Is Usually Scary. Not this Time.* Barron’s, May 31, 2019.

768 assessments necessarily involve the application of reasoned and experience judgment. As
769 discussed throughout my testimony, that judgment supports my recommended range of
770 9.90 percent to 10.75 percent.

771 **VII. CAPITAL STRUCTURE**

772 **Q. What is the Company's proposed capital structure?**

773 A. While the Company's actual projected 2019 equity ratio is 60.00 percent, the Company
774 has proposed a capital structure consisting of 55.00 percent common equity and 45.00
775 percent long-term debt.

776 **Q. How does the capital structure affect the Cost of Equity?**

777 A. The capital structure relates to a company's financial risk, which represents the risk that a
778 company may not have adequate cash flows to meet its financial obligations, and is a
779 function of the percentage of debt (or financial leverage) in its capital structure. As the
780 percentage of debt in the capital structure increases, so do the fixed obligations for the
781 repayment of that debt. Consequently, as the degree of financial leverage increases, the
782 risk of financial distress (*i.e.*, financial risk) also increases. That risk is particularly
783 relevant given the long-lived nature of utility assets. The average useful life of the DEI's
784 gas distribution utility plant in service is more than 40 years.⁵⁹ Because equity is
785 perpetual and helps extend the average tenor of the securities financing the rate base, it is
786 appropriate to consider the ratios of long-term debt and equity in determining the capital
787 structure. Lastly, because the capital structure can affect the subject company's overall

59 See Dominion Energy, Inc., SEC Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2018, at 101.

788 level of risk,⁶⁰ it is an important consideration in establishing a just and reasonable rate of
789 return.

790 **Q. Please discuss your analysis of the capital structures of the proxy group companies.**

791 A. Because it is appropriate to normalize the relative relationship between the capital
792 components over a period of time when making the comparison to the Company's capital
793 structure, I calculated the average capital structure for each of the proxy group companies
794 over the last eight quarters. As shown in DEW Exhibit 2.11, the mean of the proxy group
795 actual capital structures is 52.29 percent common equity and 47.71 percent long-term
796 debt. The average common equity ratios (on a company-specific basis) range from 40.35
797 percent to 62.09 percent. Based on that review, it is apparent that the Company's actual
798 and proposed capital structure are generally consistent with the capital structures of the
799 proxy group companies.

800 **Q. What is your conclusion regarding an appropriate capital structure for DEW?**

801 A. Considering the proxy group companies' average common equity ratios range from 40.35
802 percent to 62.09 percent, I believe that DEW's actual common equity ratio of 60.00
803 percent and proposed common equity ratio of 55.00 percent are appropriate as each is
804 consistent with the proxy group companies.

805 **VIII. COST OF DEBT**

806 **Q. What Cost of Debt has the Company requested in this proceeding?**

807 A. The Company has proposed a Cost of Debt of 4.37 percent.

60 See Roger A. Morin, New Regulatory Finance, Public Utility Reports, Inc., 2006, at 45-46.

808 **Q. Please discuss your analysis of the Company's Cost of Debt.**

809 A. To test the reasonableness of the Company's proposed Cost of Debt, I reviewed the yield
810 on equivalent debt at the time of issuance. As shown in DEW Exhibit 2.12, I compared
811 the cost of each individual issuance to the Moody's A and BBB Utility Index at the time
812 of the issuance.⁶¹ The expected Cost of Debt, based on the Moody's A and BBB Utility
813 Bond Index (the "Moody's Index") ranges from 4.30 percent to 4.69 percent, indicating
814 that the Company's 4.37 percent proposed weighted average Cost of Debt is reasonable.

815 **IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION**

816 **Q. What is your conclusion regarding the Company's Cost of Equity and capital**
817 **structure?**

818 A. As discussed throughout my Direct Testimony, and in keeping with the *Hope* and
819 *Bluefield* standards described earlier, it is prudent and appropriate to consider multiple
820 methodologies to arrive at an ROE recommendation for DEW. As discussed in Section
821 X and as shown in DEW Exhibit 2.2 through DEW Exhibit 2.12, I have performed
822 several analyses to estimate DEW's Cost of Equity. In light of those results, and taking
823 into consideration other relevant and observable market data, including certain risk
824 factors the Company faces, I believe that an ROE in the range of 9.90 percent to 10.75
825 percent represents the range of returns required by equity investors under current and
826 expected market conditions. Within that range, I conclude that an ROE of 10.50 percent
827 represents an appropriate estimate of the Cost of Equity for DEW considering its risk
828 profile. Specifically, my recommendation also considers (but does not make specific
829 adjustments for) (1) the risk associated with electrification; (2) the Company's planned

61 DEW Exhibit 2.12.

830 capital expenditures and the effect, if any, of certain regulatory mechanisms; and (3) the
831 direct costs associated with equity issuances. Lastly, I conclude that the Company's
832 proposed capital structure, which includes 55.00 percent common equity and 45.00
833 percent long-term debt, and proposed Cost of Debt of 4.37 percent, are reasonable and
834 appropriate.

835 **Q. Does this conclude your Direct Testimony?**

836 **A.** Yes, it does.

837 X. APPENDIX A

838 A. *Constant Growth Discounted Cash Flow Model*

839 Q. **Please more fully describe the Constant Growth DCF approach.**

840 A. The Constant Growth DCF approach is based on the theory that a stock's current price
841 represents the present value of all expected future cash flows. In its simplest form, the
842 Constant Growth DCF model expresses the Cost of Equity as the discount rate that sets
843 the current price equal to expected cash flows:

844
$$P = \frac{D_1}{(1+k)} + \frac{D_2}{(1+k)^2} + \dots + \frac{D_\infty}{(1+k)^\infty} \quad [4]$$

845 where P represents the current stock price, $D_1 \dots D_\infty$ represent expected future dividends,
846 and k is the discount rate, or required ROE. Equation [4] is a standard present value
847 calculation that can be simplified and rearranged into the familiar form:

848
$$k = \frac{D_0 (1+g)}{P} + g \quad [5]$$

849 Equation [5] often is referred to as the "Constant Growth DCF" model, in which the first
850 term is the expected dividend yield and the second term is the expected long-term annual
851 growth rate.

852 Q. **What assumptions are inherent in the Constant Growth DCF model?**

853 A. The Constant Growth DCF model assumes: (1) earnings, book value, and dividends all
854 grow at the same, constant rate in perpetuity; (2) a constant dividend payout ratio in
855 perpetuity; (3) the observed P/E ratio will remain constant in perpetuity; and (4)
856 estimated Cost of Equity will remain constant, also in perpetuity.

857 **Q. What market data did you use to calculate the dividend yield in your Constant**
858 **Growth DCF model?**

859 A. The dividend yield is based on each proxy company's current annualized dividend and
860 average closing stock price over the 30-, 90-, and 180-trading day periods as of
861 September 30, 2019, as explained more fully below.

862 **Q. Why did you use three averaging periods to calculate an average stock price?**

863 A. I did so to ensure the model's results are not skewed by anomalous events that may affect
864 stock prices on any given trading day. At the same time, the averaging period should be
865 reasonably representative of expected capital market conditions over the long term. In
866 my view, using 30-, 90-, and 180-trading day averaging periods reasonably balances
867 those concerns.

868 **Q. Did you make any adjustments to the dividend yield to account for periodic growth**
869 **in dividends?**

870 A. Yes, I did. Because utility companies tend to increase their quarterly dividends at
871 different times throughout the year, it is reasonable to assume that dividend increases will
872 be evenly distributed over calendar quarters. Given that assumption, it is appropriate to
873 calculate the expected dividend yield by applying one-half of the long-term growth rate
874 to the current dividend yield. That adjustment ensures that the expected dividend yield is,
875 on average, representative of the coming twelve-month period, and does not overstate the
876 dividends to be paid during that time.

877 **Q. Is it important to select appropriate measures of long-term growth in applying the**
878 **DCF model?**

879 A. Yes. In its Constant Growth form, the DCF model (*i.e.*, as presented in Equation [5]
880 above) assumes a single growth estimate in perpetuity. Accordingly, to reduce the long-
881 term growth rate to a single measure, one must assume a fixed payout ratio, and the same
882 constant growth rate for earnings per share (“EPS”), dividends per share, and book value
883 per share. Since dividend growth can only be sustained by earnings growth, the model
884 should incorporate a variety of measures of long-term earnings growth. This can be
885 accomplished by averaging those measures of long-term growth that tend to be least
886 influenced by capital allocation decisions that companies may make in response to near-
887 term changes in the business environment. Because such decisions may directly affect
888 near-term dividend payout ratios, estimates of earnings growth are more indicative of
889 long-term investor expectations than are dividend growth estimates. Therefore, for the
890 purposes of the Constant Growth DCF model, growth in EPS represents the appropriate
891 measure of long-term growth.

892 **Q. Please summarize the findings of academic research on the appropriate measure for**
893 **estimating equity returns using the DCF model.**

894 A. The relationship between various growth rates and stock valuation metrics has been the
895 subject of much academic research.⁶² As noted over 40 years ago by Charles Phillips in
896 The Economics of Regulation:

897 For many years, it was thought that investors bought utility stocks
898 largely on the basis of dividends. More recently, however, studies

62 See, for example, Robert S. Harris, *Using Analysts' Growth Forecasts to Estimate Shareholder Required Rate of Return*, Financial Management, Spring 1986.

899 indicate that the market is valuing utility stocks with reference to total
900 per share earnings, so that the earnings-price ratio has assumed
901 increased emphasis in rate cases.⁶³

902 Phillips' conclusion continues to hold true. Subsequent academic research has clearly
903 and consistently indicated that measures of earnings and cash flow are strongly related to
904 returns, and that analysts' forecasts of growth are superior to other measures of growth in
905 predicting stock prices.⁶⁴ For example, Vander Weide and Carleton state that, "[our]
906 results...are consistent with the hypothesis that investors use analysts' forecasts, rather
907 than historically oriented growth calculations, in making stock buy-and-sell decisions."⁶⁵
908 Other research specifically has noted the importance of analysts' growth estimates in
909 determining the Cost of Equity, and in the valuation of equity securities. Dr. Robert
910 Harris noted that "a growing body of knowledge shows that analysts' earnings forecasts
911 are indeed reflected in stock prices."⁶⁶ Citing Cragg and Malkiel, Dr. Harris notes that
912 those authors "found that the evaluations of companies that analysts make are the sorts of
913 ones on which market valuation is based."⁶⁷ As Brigham, Shome and Vinson noted,
914 "evidence in the current literature indicates that (i) analysts' forecasts are superior to

63 Charles F. Phillips, Jr., The Economics of Regulation, Revised Edition, 1969, Richard D. Irwin, Inc., at 285.

64 See, for example, Christofi, Christofi, Lori and Moliver, *Evaluating Common Stocks Using Value Line's Projected Cash Flows and Implied Growth Rate*, Journal of Investing (Spring 1999); Harris and Marston, *Estimating Shareholder Risk Premia Using Analysts' Growth Forecasts*, Financial Management, 21 (Summer 1992); and Vander Weide and Carleton, *Investor Growth Expectations: Analysts vs. History*, The Journal of Portfolio Management, Spring 1988.

65 Vander Weide and Carleton, *Investor Growth Expectations: Analysts vs. History*, The Journal of Portfolio Management, Spring 1988.

66 Robert S. Harris, *Using Analysts' Growth Forecasts to Estimate Shareholder Required Rate of Return*, Financial Management, Spring 1986.

67 *Id.*

915 forecasts based solely on time series data; and (ii) investors do rely on analysts'
916 forecasts."⁶⁸

917 To that point, the research of Carleton and Vander Weide found earnings growth
918 projections had a statistically significant relationship to stock valuation levels, whereas
919 dividend growth rates did not.⁶⁹ Those findings suggest that investors form their
920 investment decisions based on expectations of growth in earnings, not dividends.
921 Consequently, earnings growth not dividend growth, is the appropriate estimate in the
922 Constant Growth DCF model.

923 **Q. Please summarize your inputs to the Constant Growth DCF model.**

924 A. I applied the DCF model to the proxy group of natural gas utility companies using the
925 following inputs for the price and dividend terms:

- 926 • The average daily closing prices for the 30-, 90-, and 180-trading days ended
927 September 30, 2019 for the term P_0 ; and
- 928 • The annualized dividend per share as of September 30, 2019 for the term D_0 .

929 I then calculated my DCF results using each of the following growth terms:

- 930 • The Zacks consensus long-term earnings growth estimates;
- 931 • The First Call consensus long-term earnings growth estimates;
- 932 • The Value Line long-term earnings growth estimates; and
- 933 • An estimate of retention growth.

68 Eugene F. Brigham, Dilip K. Shome, and Steve R. Vinson, *The Risk Premium Approach to Measuring a Utility's Cost of Equity*, Financial Management, Spring 1985.

69 See Vander Weide and Carleton, *Investor Growth Expectations: Analysts vs. History*, The Journal of Portfolio Management, Spring 1988.

934 As explained below, I calculated a low, mean, and high DCF result for each proxy
935 company (*see*, DEW Exhibit 2.2).

936 **Q. Please describe the retention growth estimate as applied in your DCF model.**

937 A. The Retention Growth model, which is a generally recognized and widely taught method
938 of estimating long-term growth, is an alternative approach to the use of analysts' earnings
939 growth estimates. The model estimates growth as a function of (1) expected earnings,
940 and (2) the extent to which earnings are retained. In its simplest form, the model
941 represents long-term growth as the product of the retention ratio (*i.e.*, the percentage of
942 earnings not paid out as dividends (referred to below as "b") and the expected return on
943 book equity (referred to below as "r")). Thus, the simple "b x r" form of the model
944 projects growth as a function of internally generated funds. That form of the model is
945 limiting, however, in that it does not provide for growth funded from external equity.

946 The "br + sv" form of the Retention Growth estimate used in my DCF analysis is
947 meant to reflect growth from both internally generated funds (*i.e.*, the "br" term) and
948 from issuances of equity (*i.e.*, the "sv" term). The first term, which is the product of the
949 retention ratio (*i.e.*, "b", or the portion of net income not paid in dividends) and the
950 expected Return on Equity (*i.e.*, "r") represents the portion of net income that is "plowed
951 back" into the Company as a means of funding growth. The "sv" term is represented as:

$$\left(\frac{M}{B} - 1\right) \times \text{Growth rate in Common Shares} \quad [6]$$

952 where $\frac{M}{B}$ is the Market-to-Book ratio. In this form, the "sv" term reflects an element of
953 growth as the product of (a) the growth in shares outstanding, and (b) that portion of the

954 market-to-book ratio that exceeds unity. As shown in DEW Exhibit 2.3, all components
955 of the Retention Growth model may be derived from data provided by Value Line.

956 **Q. How did you calculate the mean high and mean low DCF results?**

957 A. For each proxy company, I calculated the high DCF result by combining the maximum
958 EPS growth rate estimate as reported by Value Line, Zacks, and First Call with the
959 subject company's dividend yield. The mean high result simply is the average of those
960 estimates. I used the same approach to calculate the low DCF result, using instead the
961 minimum of the Value Line, Zacks, and First Call estimate for each proxy company, and
962 calculating the average result for those estimates.

963 **Q. What are the results of your Constant Growth DCF analysis?**

964 A. My Constant Growth DCF results are summarized in Table 9 below (*see also*, DEW
965 Exhibit 2.2).

966 **Table 9: Mean Constant Growth DCF Results⁷⁰**

	Mean Low	Mean	Mean High
30-Day Average	7.51%	9.95%	13.98%
90-Day Average	7.51%	9.94%	13.97%
180-Day Average	7.58%	10.01%	14.05%

967

968 **B. CAPM Analysis and Empirical CAPM Analysis**

969 **Q. Please briefly describe the general form of the CAPM analysis.**

970 A. The CAPM analysis is a risk premium method that estimates the Cost of Equity for a
971 given security as a function of a risk-free return plus a risk premium (to compensate
972 investors for the non-diversifiable or "systematic" risk of that security). As shown in

70 DEW Exhibit 2.2.

973 Equation [6], the CAPM is defined by four components, each of which theoretically must
974 be a forward-looking estimate:

975
$$K_e = r_f + \beta(r_m - r_f) \quad [7]$$

976 where:

977 K_e = the required market ROE for a security;

978 β = the Beta coefficient of that security;


979 r_f = the risk-free rate of return; and

980 r_m = the required return on the market as a whole.

981 Equation [6] describes the Security Market Line (“SML”), or the CAPM risk-return
982 relationship, which is graphically depicted in Chart 9, below. The intercept is the risk-
983 free rate (r_f), which has a Beta coefficient of zero, the slope is the expected Market Risk
984 Premium ($r_m - r_f$). By definition, r_m , the return on the market has a Beta coefficient of
985 1.00. Under the CAPM, the expected Equity Risk Premium for a given security is
986 proportional to its Beta coefficient.

987

Chart 9: Security Market Line



988

989

990

991

992

993

994

In Equation [6], the term $(r_m - r_f)$ represents the Market Risk Premium.⁷¹ According to the theory underlying the CAPM, because unsystematic risk can be diversified away by adding securities to investment portfolios, the market will not compensate investors for bearing that risk. Therefore, investors should be concerned only with systematic or non-diversifiable risk. Non-diversifiable risk is measured by the Beta coefficient, which is defined as:

995

$$\beta_j = \frac{\sigma_j}{\sigma_m} \times \rho_{j,m} \quad [8]$$

996

997

998

999

where σ_j is the standard deviation of returns for company “j,” σ_m is the standard deviation of returns for the broad market (as measured, for example, by the S&P 500 Index), and $\rho_{j,m}$ is the correlation of returns in between company j and the broad market. The Beta coefficient therefore represents both relative volatility (*i.e.*, the standard deviation) of

71 The Market Risk Premium is defined as the incremental return of the market portfolio over the risk-free rate.

1000 returns, and the correlation in returns between the subject company and the overall
1001 market.

1002 Intuitively, companies with higher Beta coefficients have had more volatile
1003 returns and have moved more closely with the overall market. The implication is that a
1004 company with a Beta coefficient of 1.00 is as risky as the overall market; companies with
1005 Beta coefficients less than 1.00 are less risky, and those whose Beta coefficients are
1006 greater than 1.00 have greater risk than the overall market.

1007 **Q. What assumptions did you include in your CAPM analysis?**

1008 A. Because utility assets represent long duration investments, I used two different measures
1009 of the risk-free rate: (1) the current 30-day average yield on 30-year Treasury bonds (2.11
1010 percent)⁷²; and (2) the near-term projected 30-year Treasury yield (2.28 percent).⁷³

1011 **Q. Why have you relied on the 30-year Treasury yield for your CAPM analysis?**

1012 A. In determining the risk-free rate, it is important to select the term (or maturity) that best
1013 matches the life of the underlying investment. Natural gas distribution utilities typically
1014 are long-duration investments and as such, the 30-year Treasury yield is most suitable for
1015 the purpose of calculating the Cost of Equity.

1016 **Q. Please describe your *ex-ante* (i.e., forward-looking) approach to estimating the
1017 Market Risk Premium.**

1018 A. The approach is based on the market required return, less the current 30-year Treasury
1019 yield. To estimate the market required return, I calculated the market capitalization
1020 weighted average ROE based on the Constant Growth DCF model. To do so, I relied on

72 Source: Bloomberg Professional.

73 Source: Blue Chip Financial Forecast, Vol. 38, No. 5, October 1, 2019, at 2.

1021 data from two sources: (1) Bloomberg; and (2) Value Line. With respect to Bloomberg-
1022 derived growth estimates, I calculated the expected dividend yield (using the same one-
1023 half growth rate assumption described earlier), and combined that amount with the
1024 projected earnings growth rate to arrive at the market capitalization weighted average
1025 DCF result. I performed that calculation for each of the S&P 500 companies for which
1026 Bloomberg provided consensus growth rates. I then subtracted the current 30-year
1027 Treasury yield from that amount to arrive at the market DCF-derived *ex-ante* market risk
1028 premium estimate. In the case of Value Line, I performed the same calculation, again
1029 using all companies for which five-year earnings growth rates were available. The results
1030 of those calculations are provided in DEW Exhibit 2.4.

1031 **Q. How did you apply your expected Market Risk Premium and risk-free rate**
1032 **estimates?**

1033 A. I relied on the *ex-ante* Market Risk Premia discussed above, together with the current and
1034 near-term projected 30-year Treasury yields as inputs to my CAPM analyses.

1035 **Q. What Beta coefficient did you use in your CAPM model?**

1036 A. As shown in DEW Exhibit 2.5, I considered Beta coefficients reported by two sources,
1037 Bloomberg and Value Line. Although both services adjust their calculated (or “raw”)
1038 Beta coefficients to reflect the tendency to regress to the market mean of 1.00, Value
1039 Line calculates the Beta coefficient over a five-year period, whereas Bloomberg’s
1040 calculation is based on two years of data.

1041 **Q. What are the results of your CAPM analysis?**

1042 A. As shown in Table 10, below, the CAPM analyses suggest an ROE range of 9.14 percent
1043 to 10.58 percent (*see also*, DEW Exhibit 2.6).

1044

Table 10: Summary of CAPM Results⁷⁴

	Bloomberg Derived Market Risk Premium	Value Line Derived Market Risk Premium
<i>Average Bloomberg Beta Coefficient</i>		
Current 30-Year Treasury (2.11%)	9.14%	9.30%
Near Term Projected 30-Year Treasury (2.28%)	9.31%	9.47%
<i>Average Value Line Beta Coefficient</i>		
Current 30-Year Treasury (2.11%)	10.22%	10.41%
Near Term Projected 30-Year Treasury (2.28%)	10.40%	10.58%

1045


1046 **Q. Does the recent decline in the proxy group average Beta coefficient imply a decrease**
1047 **in risk relative to the market?**

1048 A. Not necessarily. Although the proxy group average Beta coefficient reported by
1049 Bloomberg has fallen from approximately 0.72 in 2014 to 0.58 in September 2019, as
1050 Chart 10, below, demonstrates, when the Beta coefficient is deconstructed into its
1051 components shown in Equation [8] above, we see that the correlation between the proxy
1052 group companies and the S&P 500 has declined, while the relative risk has increased.
1053 Given that the correlation between the proxy group companies and the S&P 500 has
1054 declined since 2014, while the relative risk has increased, the CAPM in the form
1055 presented here may not adequately reflect the expected systematic risk, and therefore, the
1056 returns required by investors in low-Beta coefficient companies such as utilities.

74 DEW Exhibit 2.6.

1057

Chart 10: Components of Beta Coefficients Over Time⁷⁵



1058

1059 **Q. Did you consider another form of the CAPM in your analysis?**

1060 A. Yes. I also included the ECAPM approach, which calculates the product of the adjusted
1061 Beta coefficient and the Market Risk Premium, and applies a weight of 75.00 percent to
1062 that result. The model then applies a 25.00 percent weight to the Market Risk Premium,
1063 without any effect from the Beta coefficient.⁷⁶ The results of the two calculations are
1064 summed, along with the risk-free rate, to produce the ECAPM result, as noted in
1065 Equation [9] below:

1066
$$k_e = r_f + 0.75\beta(r_m - r_f) + 0.25(r_m - r_f) \quad [9]$$

1067 where:

1068 k_e = the required market ROE.

1069 β = Adjusted Beta coefficient of an individual security.

1070 r_f = the risk-free rate of return.

75 Calculated as an index. Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence.
76 See, e.g., Roger A. Morin, New Regulatory Finance, 189-90 (2006).

1071 r_m = the required return on the market as a whole.

1072 **Q. What is the benefit of the ECAPM approach?**

1073 A. The ECAPM addresses the tendency of the CAPM to under-estimate the Cost of Equity
1074 for companies, such as regulated utilities, with low Beta coefficients. As discussed
1075 below, the ECAPM recognizes the results of academic research indicating that the risk-
1076 return relationship is different (in essence, flatter) than estimated by the CAPM, and that
1077 the CAPM under-estimates the alpha, or the constant return term.⁷⁷

1078 Numerous tests of the CAPM have measured the extent to which security returns
1079 and Beta coefficients are related as predicted by the CAPM. The ECAPM method
1080 reflects the finding that the actual Security Market Line (SML) described by the CAPM
1081 formula is not as steeply sloped as the predicted SML.⁷⁸ Fama and French state that
1082 “[t]he returns on the low beta portfolios are too high, and the returns on the high beta
1083 portfolios are too low.”⁷⁹ Similarly, Morin states:

1084 With few exceptions, the empirical studies agree that . . . low-beta
1085 securities earn returns somewhat higher than the CAPM would predict,
1086 and high-beta securities earn less than predicted. . . .

1087 Therefore, the empirical evidence suggests that the expected return on
1088 a security is related to its risk by the following approximation:

1089
$$K = R_F + x(R_M - R_F) + (1-x) \beta(R_M - R_F)$$

1090 where x is a fraction to be determined empirically. The value of x that
1091 best explains the observed relationship $\text{Return} = 0.0829 + 0.0520 \beta$ is
1092 between 0.25 and 0.30. If $x = 0.25$, the equation becomes:

77 *Id.*, at 191 (“The ECAPM and the use of adjusted betas comprised two separate features of asset pricing. Even if a company’s beta is estimated accurately, the CAPM still understates the return for low-beta stocks.”).

78 *Id.*, at 175. The Security Market Line plots the CAPM estimate on the Y-axis, and Beta coefficients on the X-axis.

79 Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, *The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence*, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 18, No. 3, Summer 2004, at 33.

1093
$$K = R_F + 0.25(R_M - R_F) + 0.75 \beta(R_M - R_F)$$
⁸⁰

1094 Some analysts claim that using adjusted Beta coefficients addresses the empirical
1095 issues with the CAPM by increasing the expected returns for low Beta coefficient stocks
1096 and decreasing the returns for high Beta coefficient stocks, concluding that there is no
1097 need for the ECAPM approach. I disagree with that conclusion. Beta coefficients are
1098 adjusted because of their general regression tendency to converge toward 1.00 over time,
1099 *i.e.*, over successive calculations. As also noted earlier, numerous studies have
1100 determined that at any given point in time, the SML described by the CAPM formula is
1101 not as steeply sloped as the predicted SML. To that point, Morin states:

1102 Some have argued that the use of the ECAPM is inconsistent with the
1103 use of adjusted betas, such as those supplied by Value Line and
1104 Bloomberg. This is because the reason for using the ECAPM is to
1105 allow for the tendency of betas to regress toward the mean value of
1106 1.00 over time, and, since Value Line betas are already adjusted for
1107 such trend, an ECAPM analysis results in double-counting. This
1108 argument is erroneous. Fundamentally, the ECAPM is not an
1109 adjustment, increase or decrease, in beta. This is obvious from the fact
1110 that the expected return on high beta securities is actually lower than
1111 that produced by the CAPM estimate. The ECAPM is a formal
1112 recognition that the observed risk-return tradeoff is flatter than
1113 predicted by the CAPM based on myriad empirical evidence. The
1114 ECAPM and the use of adjusted betas comprised two separate features
1115 of asset pricing. Even if a company's beta is estimated accurately, the
1116 CAPM still understates the return for low-beta stocks. Even if the
1117 ECAPM is used, the return for low-beta securities is understated if the
1118 betas are understated. Referring back to Figure 6-1, the ECAPM is a
1119 return (vertical axis) adjustment and not a beta (horizontal axis)
1120 adjustment. Both adjustments are necessary.⁸¹

1121 Therefore, it is appropriate to rely on adjusted Beta coefficients in both the CAPM
1122 and ECAPM. As with the CAPM, my application of the ECAPM uses the Market DCF-
1123 derived *ex-ante* Market Risk Premium estimate, the current yield on 30-year Treasury

80 Roger A. Morin, New Regulatory Finance, 175, 190 (2006).

81 *Id.*, at 191.

1124 securities as the risk-free rate, and two estimates of the Beta coefficient. The results of
1125 my ECAPM analyses are shown in DEW Exhibit 2.6 and summarized in Table 11,
1126 below.

1127 **Table 11: Summary of ECAPM Results**⁸²

	Bloomberg Derived Market Risk Premium	Value Line Derived Market Risk Premium
<i>Average Bloomberg Beta Coefficient</i>		
Current 30-Year Treasury (2.11%)	10.40%	10.59%
Near Term Projected 30-Year Treasury (2.28%)	10.57%	10.76%
<i>Average Value Line Beta Coefficient</i>		
Current 30-Year Treasury (2.11%)	11.22%	11.43%
Near Term Projected 30-Year Treasury (2.28%)	11.39%	11.60%

1128

1129 **C. Bond Yield Plus Risk Premium Approach**

1130 **Q. Please generally describe the Bond Yield Plus Risk Premium approach.**

1131 A. This approach is based on the basic financial principle that because equity investors bear
1132 the residual risk associated with ownership, they require a premium over the return they
1133 would have earned as a bondholder. That is, because returns to equity holders are more
1134 risky than returns to bondholders, equity investors must be compensated for bearing that
1135 additional risk. Risk premium approaches, therefore, estimate the Cost of Equity as the
1136 sum of the equity risk premium and the yield on a particular class of bonds. As noted in
1137 my discussion of the CAPM, because the equity risk premium is not directly observable,
1138 it typically is estimated using a variety of approaches, some of which incorporate *ex-ante*,

82 DEW Exhibit 2.6.

1139 or forward-looking estimates of the Cost of Equity, and others that consider historical, or
1140 *ex-post*, estimates. An alternative approach is to use actual authorized returns for natural
1141 gas utilities to estimate the Equity Risk Premium.

1142 **Q. Please explain how you performed your Bond Yield Plus Risk Premium analysis.**

1143 A. As suggested above, I first defined the Risk Premium as the difference between the
1144 authorized ROE and the then-prevailing level of the long-term (*i.e.*, 30-year) Treasury
1145 yield. I then gathered data for 1,123 natural gas utility rate proceedings between January
1146 1980 and September 30, 2019. In addition to the authorized ROE, I also calculated the
1147 average period between the filing of the case and the date of the final order (the “lag
1148 period”). To reflect the prevailing level of interest rates during the pendency of the
1149 proceedings, I calculated the average 30-year Treasury yield over the average lag period
1150 (approximately 187 days).

1151 Because the data covers multiple economic cycles, the analysis also may be used
1152 to assess the stability of the Equity Risk Premium. Prior research, for example, has
1153 shown that the Equity Risk Premium is inversely related to the level of interest rates.⁸³
1154 That analysis is particularly relevant given the relatively low, but increasing level of
1155 current Treasury yields.

⁸³ See, for example, Robert S. Harris and Felicia C. Marston, *Estimating Shareholder Risk Premia Using Analysts' Growth Forecasts*, Financial Management, (Summer 1992), at 63-70; Eugene F. Brigham, Dilip K. Shome, and Steve R. Vinson, *The Risk Premium Approach to Measuring a Utility's Cost of Equity*, Financial Management, (Spring 1985), at 33-45; and Farris M. Maddox, Donna T. Pippert, and Rodney N. Sullivan, *An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Risk Premiums for the Electric Utility Industry*, Financial Management, (Autumn 1995), at 89-95.


1156 **Q. How did you model the relationship between interest rates and the Equity Risk**
1157 **Premium?**

1158 A. The basic method used was regression analysis, in which the observed Equity Risk
1159 Premium is the dependent variable, and the average 30-year Treasury yield is the
1160 independent variable. Relative to the long-term historical average, the analytical period
1161 includes interest rates and authorized ROEs that are quite high during one period (*i.e.*, the
1162 1980s) and that are quite low during another (*i.e.*, the post-Lehman bankruptcy period).
1163 To account for that variability, I used the semi-log regression, in which the Equity Risk
1164 Premium is expressed as a function of the natural log of the 30-year Treasury yield:

1165
$$RP = \alpha + \beta(LN(T_{30})) \quad [10]$$

1166 As shown on Chart 11, below, the semi-log form is useful when measuring an absolute
1167 change in the dependent variable (in this case, the Risk Premium) relative to a
1168 proportional change in the independent variable (the 30-year Treasury yield).

1169 **Chart 11: Equity Risk Premium⁸⁴**



1170

1171 As Chart 11 illustrates, the Equity Risk Premium increases as interest rates fall.
1172 That finding, that there is an inverse relationship between interest rates and the Equity
1173 Risk Premium is supported by published research. For example, Dr. Roger Morin notes
1174 that: "... [p]ublished studies by Brigham, Shome, and Vinson (1985), Harris (1986),
1175 Harris and Marston (1992, 1993), Carleton, Chambers, and Lakonishok (1983), Morin
1176 (2005), McShane (2005), and others demonstrate that, beginning in 1980, risk premiums
1177 varied inversely with the level of interest rates - rising when rates fell and declining when
1178 interest rates rose."⁸⁵ Consequently, simply applying the long-term average Equity Risk
1179 Premium of 4.70 percent would significantly understate the Cost of Equity and produce
1180 results well below any reasonable estimate. Based on the regression coefficients in Chart
1181 11, however, the implied ROE is between 9.96 percent and 10.01 percent (*see*, Table 12,
1182 below, and DEW Exhibit 2.7).

1183 **Table 12: Summary of Bond Yield Plus Risk Premium Results⁸⁶**

	Return on Equity
Current 30-Year Treasury (2.92%)	9.96%
Near-Term Projected 30-Year Treasury (3.08%)	9.91%
Long-Term Projected 30-Year Treasury (4.05%)	10.01%

1184

1185 ***D. Expected Earnings Analysis***

1186 **Q. Please describe the Expected Earnings analysis.**

1187 A. The Expected Earnings analysis is based on the principle of opportunity costs. Because
1188 investors may invest in, and earn returns on alternative investments of similar risk, those

85 Roger A. Morin, New Regulatory Finance, Public Utilities Reports, Inc., 2006, at 128 [clarification added]
86 DEW Exhibit 2.7.

1189 rates of return can provide a useful benchmark in determining the appropriate rate of
1190 return for a firm. Further, because those results are based solely on the returns expected
1191 by investors, exclusive of market-data or models, the Expected Earnings approach
1192 provides a direct comparison.

1193 **Q. Please explain how the Expected Earnings analysis is conducted.**

1194 A. The Expected Earnings analysis typically takes the actual earnings on book value of
1195 investment for each of the members of the proxy group and compares those values to the
1196 rate of return in question. Although the traditional approach uses data based on historical
1197 accounting records, it is common to use forecasted data in conducting the analysis.
1198 Projected returns on book investment are provided by various industry publications (*e.g.*,
1199 Value Line), which I have used in my analysis.

1200 I relied on Value Line's projected Return on Common Equity for the period 2022-
1201 2024, and adjusted those projected returns to account for the fact that they reflect
1202 common shares outstanding at the end of the period, rather than the average shares
1203 outstanding over the course of the year.⁸⁷ The results range from 9.08 percent to 12.09
1204 percent, with an average value of 10.73 percent and median value of 10.24 percent (*see*,
1205 DEW Exhibit 2.8).

87 The rationale for that adjustment is straightforward: Earnings are achieved over the course of a year, and should be related to the equity that was, on average, in place during that year. *See*, Leopold A. Bernstein, Financial Statement Analysis: Theory, Application, and Interpretation, Irwin, 4th Ed., 1988, at 630.

Commonwealth of Massachusetts)
) ss.
County of Worcester)

I, Robert B. Hevert, being first duly sworn on oath, state that the answers in the foregoing written testimony are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. Except as stated in the testimony, the exhibits attached to the testimony were prepared by me or under my direction and supervision, and they are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. Any exhibits not prepared by me or under my direction and supervision are true and correct copies of the documents they purport to be.



Robert B. Hevert

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO this November 1, 2019.



Notary Public

